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Abstract
Although many quantum security tools have been proposed, many of them are quantum secret key distribution
protocols. However, we naturally wish to construct quantum cryptosystems different from the conventional cryp-
tosystems. In this paper, first, we show simple methods with prior entanglement in order to split a party’s message
among some parties securely. Moreover, as an application, we also show that by using our splitting methods, we
can construct not only quantum secret key distribution protocols but also quantum cryptosystems. Some of our
quantum cryptosystems are different from the conventional cryptosystems because they are executed interactively.
© 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
As an application of quantum information techniques, quantum information security has been studied
and many quantum security tools have been proposed. However, many of these are quantum secret key
distribution protocols, more precisely, quantum secret key generation protocols (see, e.g. [1,2,9,11]). Al-
though it is important to construct such protocols, the cryptosystem used after distributing a secret key is
only a classical one. Therefore, we wish to obtain other security tools such as quantum cryptosystems. In
other words, because we now have a paradigm called quantum physics different from classical physics,
it will be natural that we wish to construct cryptosystems based on quantum physics different from the
structure of the conventional cryptosystems.
On the other hand, it is thought that entanglement is essential as one of the principal abilities in quan-
tum information techniques. The most successful examples are Shor’s quantum factoring algorithm [21]
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and Grover’s quantum search algorithm [12]. Their techniques are used in several fields called “quantum
information”. Moreover, the entanglement is also used in several quantum communication protocols,
e.g., in quantum error corrections, quantum teleportations, quantum communication complexity theory,
quantum cryptography, and so on. As a summary of these fields, we shall refer the reader to the books
[6,18].
Especially, by using some types of entangled states that are shared among parties in communication
protocols, it has been shown that the quantum communication complexity of some problems is less than
the classical one (see, e.g. [7,8,10]). The entanglement used in communication protocols is called prior
entanglement because it is shared beforehand among the parties. As the central role of the prior entan-
glement, the parties can share some information for solving problems without communication among
them.
In this paper, first, we show simple methods with the prior entanglement in order to split a party’s
message among some parties securely. In other words, assuming that legitimate parties share entangled
states before they begin a splitting protocol, a party’s message is split among the legitimate parties
without being subject to eavesdropping. This technique is similar to the technique used in the quan-
tum communication complexity theory. In the quantum communication complexity theory, the prior
entanglement is used as a tool for decreasing the number of communications, because it can be used in
sharing some information related to problems without communication among the parties. We show that
by viewing the property of “sharing some information without communication” from a different angle,
we can use the technique as the method of splitting a party’s message securely.
Now, let us consider splitting either a bit 0 or a bit 1 between two parties. If they wish to split 0, they
share an entangled state
1√
2
(|0, 0〉 + |1, 1〉). (1)
By measuring the state, the outcome |a, b〉 then always satisfies a ⊕ b = 0. On the other hand, if they
wish to split 1, they share another entangled state
1√
2
(|0, 1〉 + |1, 0〉). (2)
By measuring the state, the outcome |a, b〉 then always satisfies a ⊕ b = 1. Note that these measure-
ments are executed without communication. Therefore, we need only a method to construct securely
the entangled states in accordance with either 0 or 1, and the technique in the quantum communication
complexity theory is used in order to construct it: in the quantum communication complexity theory, the
entangled states used in the protocols can be dynamically changed in accordance with each party’s input
without communication.
Moreover, by using our splitting methods, we also show that we can construct not quantum secret
key generation protocols [1,2,9,11] but quantum secret key transmission protocols. That is, a sender can
transmit his own key to receivers. Because we can regard the quantum key transmission protocols as the
protocols that can send any messages (including keys) securely, this indicates the possibility of quantum
cryptosystems. Consequently, as an application of our methods for splitting information, we show that
we can construct quantum cryptosystems. Our cryptosystems do not use the so-called keys used in the
conventional cryptosystems; however, we will be able to regard the prior entanglement as common and
private keys.
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The remainder of this paper has the following organization. In Section 2, we propose methods for
splitting information securely with prior entanglement and evaluate the security of our proposed pro-
tocols. In Section 3, as an application of our splitting methods, we propose quantum cryptosystems. In
Section 4, we compare our results with other related works, i.e., secret sharing protocols, key distribution
protocols, and quantum cryptosystems. Finally, in Section 5, we describe some concluding remarks.
2. Our protocols
2.1. Two-party protocol
In this section, we show protocols for splitting information with prior entanglement securely. We
will apply our protocols in order to construct quantum cryptosystems in the next section. Throughout
this paper, we assume that the communication channels in our protocols are error-free or noiseless and
that the entanglement can be maintained for a long time. Moreover, we also assume that the security of
the entanglement shared among parties is guaranteed against any eavesdropper, i.e., we assume that the
security of the entanglement is tested against any eavesdropper when it is shared among them.
First, we consider a protocol for splitting one bit securely between two parties: a party Alice has a bit
s1 ∈ {0, 1} and transmits the bit b1 ∈ {0, 1} satisfying s1 = a1 ⊕ b1 for a1 ∈ {0, 1} to another party Bob
without being subject to eavesdropping by any outside party. In the following, we construct an interactive
protocol for realizing this. Later we show a simplified two-party protocol in Section 2.3. However, in
order to generalize to a multiparty protocol in Section 2.2, we first construct the interactive two-party
protocol and describe its behavior. Throughout this paper, we take B = {|0〉, |1〉} as a basis. This means
that we make measurements in the z direction.
Assume that Alice and Bob share a prior entangled state
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0, 0〉 + |1, 1〉), (3)
where Alice has the first qubit and Bob has the second qubit. First, Alice operates the entangled state
|ψ〉 in accordance with the bit s1 as follows: if s1 = 0, she then applies nothing to |ψ〉, i.e., |ψ ′〉 = |ψ〉;
otherwise she applies
Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
(4)
to |ψ〉, i.e.,
|ψ〉 Z⊗I→ |ψ ′〉 = 1√
2
(|0, 0〉 − |1, 1〉), (5)
where I is the 2 × 2 identity matrix.
Next, both Alice and Bob apply the Walsh–Hadamard matrix
H = 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
(6)
to the state |ψ ′〉. If s1 = 0,
|ψ ′〉 H⊗H→ |ψ ′′〉 = 1√
2
(|0, 0〉 + |1, 1〉). (7)
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If Alice measures the final state |ψ ′′〉 in the basis B, she will then obtain a value a1 that is either 0 or 1
at random. Moreover, if Bob measures the state |ψ ′′〉 in the same basis B, he will then obtain a value b1
that is also either 0 or 1 at random. However, because the final state |ψ ′′〉 is (1/√2)(|0, 0〉 + |1, 1〉), the
outcome will always satisfy a1 ⊕ b1 = 0. Note that a1 ⊕ b1 = s1 because s1 = 0. On the other hand, if
s1 = 1,
|ψ ′〉 H⊗H→ |ψ ′′〉 = 1√
2
(|0, 1〉 + |1, 0〉). (8)
If they execute the same procedure mentioned above, then Alice and Bob will always obtain a1 and
b1, respectively, satisfying a1 ⊕ b1 = s1 because s1 = 1. Consequently, Alice can transmit the bit b1
satisfying s1 = a1 ⊕ b1 to Bob. Note that without communication, Alice and Bob obtain a1 and b1,
respectively.
The protocol mentioned above was a method for splitting only one bit. We can easily modify the pro-
tocol into a protocol for splitting n( 1) bits s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn), where si ∈ {0, 1} (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}).
First, Alice and Bob share n entangled states taking the form of Eq. (3). Next, they execute the same
protocol mentioned above for each entangled state in accordance with each bit si . Consequently, Alice
and Bob can obtain the n-bit strings a and b, respectively, satisfying s = a ⊕ b.
2.2. Multiparty protocol
Next, we show that we can extend the protocols to a multiparty case. Now, let B1, B2, . . . , Bm be m
parties. We consider a problem in which B1 has a message and splits it among m parties securely. For
simplicity and without loss of generality, we restrict the length of B1’s message to one bit denoted by
s1 ∈ {0, 1}. It is easy to modify the protocol into a multibit case: we execute only the same protocol
mentioned below with prior entanglement whose number is the length of the message.
Before the protocol begins, assume that they share an m-qubit prior entangled state
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0, 0, . . . , 0〉 + |1, 1, . . . , 1〉), (9)
where each Bj (j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}) has the j th qubit. First, B1 operates the entangled state |ψ〉 in accor-
dance with the bit s1 as follows: if s1 = 0, he then applies nothing to |ψ〉, i.e., |ψ ′〉 = |ψ〉; otherwise he
applies Z to |ψ〉, i.e.,
|ψ〉 Z⊗
⊗m
j=2 I→ |ψ ′〉 = 1√
2
(|0, 0, . . . , 0〉 − |1, 1, . . . , 1〉). (10)
Next, every Bj applies the Walsh–Hadamard matrix H to the state |ψ ′〉. If s1 = 0,
|ψ ′〉
⊗m
j=1 H→ 1√
2m−1
∑
⊕m
j=1 bj=0
|b1, b2, . . . , bm〉. (11)
Each Bj can then obtain the bit bj satisfying
⊕m
j=1 bj = 0 by measuring in the basis B. On the other
hand, if s1 = 1,
|ψ ′〉
⊗m
j=1 H→ 1√
2m−1
∑
⊕m
j=1 bj=1
|b1, b2, . . . , bm〉. (12)
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Each Bj can then obtain the bit bj satisfying
⊕m
j=1 bj = 1 by measuring in the same basis. Thus,
B1’s bit s1 is split among m parties because s1 =⊕mj=1 bj .
2.3. Non-interactive protocol
Parties had to communicate interactively when they used the protocols in the previous subsections. In
this subsection, we construct a non-interactive protocol to split information securely with prior entan-
glement. In this protocol, Bob does not need to operate entanglement.
For a reason similar to that in the previous subsections, without loss of generality, we consider split-
ting one bit, i.e., we assume that Alice has one bit s1. Moreover, assume that Alice and Bob share a
prior entangled state |ψ〉 taking the form of Eq. (3). If s1 = 0, Alice then applies nothing to |ψ〉, i.e.,
|ψ ′〉 = |ψ〉; otherwise she applies
X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
(13)
to |ψ〉, i.e.,
|ψ〉 X⊗I→ |ψ ′〉 = 1√
2
(|1, 0〉 + |0, 1〉). (14)
If they measure the state |ψ ′〉 in the basis B. Alice and Bob will then obtain a1 and b1, respectively,
satisfying a1 ⊕ b1 = s1. Note that Bob can measure the state independently of Alice’s operation. In other
words, even if Bob measures the state before Alice applies X to |ψ〉, they can share the bit s1 correctly.
2.4. Security of our protocols
Finally, we analyze the security of our proposed protocols. After legitimate parties share the entangled
states taking the form of either Eq. (3) or Eq. (9), they do not communicate with each other through any
physical channel. Therefore, the only possibility of being subject to eavesdropping by outside parties is
the time when the entangled states are shared. In this situation where they share the entangled states be-
forehand, i.e., in the situation where they share prior entanglement, this problem does not occur and our
protocols are secure. However, in the situation where they do not share the entangled states beforehand,
they must communicate with each other in order to share the entangled states. Thus, the security of our
protocols can be reduced to constructing how the entangled states that take the form of either Eq. (3) or
Eq. (9) are securely shared among the parties.
For Eq. (3), this problem is solved by Lo and Chau [15]. They construct a secure protocol sharing
the entangled states taking the form of Eq. (3). For Eq. (9), we show by induction that, if Eq. (3) can
be shared securely, Eq. (9) also can then be shared securely. This proof is based on the idea of the
multiparticle entanglement swapping in [5,23].
First, for three parties denoted by Alice, Bob, and Carol, assume that Alice and Bob share an entangled
state |ψAB〉 taking the form of Eq. (3), where Alice has the first qubit and Bob has the second qubit.
Moreover, assume that Alice and Carol also share another entangled state |ψAC〉 taking the same form,
where Alice has the first qubit and Carol has the second qubit. That is,
|ψAB〉 = 1√
2
(|0, 0〉 + |1, 1〉) and |ψAC〉 = 1√
2
(|0, 0〉 + |1, 1〉). (15)
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Hence,
|ψAB〉|ψAC〉 = 12(|0, 0, 0, 0〉 + |0, 0, 1, 1〉 + |1, 1, 0, 0〉 + |1, 1, 1, 1〉). (16)
Note that Alice has the first qubit and third qubit. Next, Alice applies the Controlled Not gate
CNOT =


1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0

 (17)
to her two qubits of |ψAB〉|ψAC〉. When the first qubit is a control qubit and the third qubit is a target
qubit, the state becomes as follows:
|ψAB〉|ψAC〉 → 12(|0, 0, 0, 0〉 + |0, 0, 1, 1〉 + |1, 1, 1, 0〉 + |1, 1, 0, 1〉). (18)
Here, Alice measures the third qubit. If the outcome is 0, the remaining state is
1√
2
(|0, 0, 0〉 + |1, 1, 1〉). (19)
Thus, they obtain the required entanglement for three parties. On the other hand, if the outcome is 1,
the remaining state is
1√
2
(|0, 0, 1〉 + |1, 1, 0〉). (20)
Finally, Alice announces the outcome to Carol through a public channel. A public channel means a
channel such that anyone can read messages but cannot alter them. If the outcome is 1, Carol applies
X to her qubit, and they obtain the required entanglement for the three parties. Even if the outcome is
subject to eavesdropping, any eavesdropper can do nothing.
Next, assume that m parties share an m-qubit entangled state |ψm〉 taking the form of Eq. (9), where
Alice has the first qubit. Moreover, assume that Alice and the (m + 1)th party Thomas share an entangled
state |ψAT〉 taking the form of Eq (3), where Alice also has the first qubit. Hence,
|ψm〉|ψAT〉 = 12(|0, . . . , 0, 0, 0〉 + |0, . . . , 0, 1, 1〉 + |1, . . . , 1, 0, 0〉 + |1, . . . , 1, 1, 1〉). (21)
Note that Alice has the first qubit and the (m + 1)th qubit. Next, when Alice applies CNOT to her two
qubits of |ψm〉|ψAT〉, the state becomes as follows:
|ψm〉|ψAT〉 → 12(|0, . . . , 0, 0, 0〉 + |0, . . . , 0, 1, 1〉 + |1, . . . , 1, 1, 0〉 + |1, . . . , 1, 0, 1〉). (22)
Here, Alice measures the (m + 1)th qubit. If the outcome is 0, the remaining state is
1√
2
(|0, . . . , 0, 0〉 + |1, . . . , 1, 1〉). (23)
Thus, they obtain the required entanglement for m + 1 parties. On the other hand, if the outcome is
1, the remaining state is
1√
2
(|0, . . . , 0, 1〉 + |1, . . . , 1, 0〉). (24)
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Finally, Alice announces the outcome to Thomas through a public channel. If the outcome is 1, he
applies X to his qubit, and they obtain the required entanglement for m + 1 parties. Consequently, they
can securely share entangled states taking the form of Eq. (9).
3. Application to cryptosystems
In the previous section, we showed the methods for securely splitting a party’s message among some
parties with prior entanglement. Moreover, we showed also a method in which the parties securely share
entangled states beforehand. As an application of our splitting methods to cryptosystems, in this section,
we show that we can construct quantum cryptosystems with prior entanglement. Our cryptosystems have
a form different from that of the conventional cryptosystems. Obviously, our cryptosystems can also be
used as key distribution protocols.
As usual, we call a sender Alice and a receiver Bob. In the conventional cryptosystems, first, Alice
creates a ciphertext from a plaintext by using either a common secret key or a public key and sends
the ciphertext to Bob. After receiving the ciphertext, Bob recovers the plaintext from the ciphertext by
using the corresponding secret key. On the other hand, the outline of our quantum cryptosystems is as
follows: first, Alice’s message, i.e., a plaintext, s, is securely split between Alice and Bob using one
of our splitting methods, where Alice and Bob can obtain a and b, respectively, satisfying s = a ⊕ b.
Next, Alice sends a to Bob. Note that from only a, any eavesdropper cannot find the original message
s because s is split at random according to the law of quantum physics. Finally, Bob recovers s by
computing a ⊕ b.
The features of our cryptosystems are as follows: (i) Alice and Bob create a ciphertext a by working
together. Therefore, they need to execute an encryption process interactively. (ii) Our cryptosystems do
not use the conventional keys. The shared entanglement corresponds to the keys. (iii) Our cryptosystems
are a kind of quantum realization of Vernam cipher. That is, the entanglement is used as a one-time pad,
and for a plaintext s, a ciphertext a is the value satisfying a = s ⊕ b. However, because in our systems,
neither Alice nor Bob needs to distribute the value b corresponding to the secret key through any physical
channel, we do not need to consider the key distribution problem except for sharing the entangled states.
Now, we construct a quantum cryptosystem using our splitting method. Let us consider that Alice
sends a message s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) ∈ {0, 1}n to Bob. They share n prior entangled states |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉, . . . ,
|ψn〉 taking the following form (cf. Eq. (3)):
|ψi〉 = 1√
2
(|0, 0〉 + |1, 1〉), (25)
where Alice has the first qubit and Bob has the second qubit. Each |ψi〉 is the entangled state used for
each bit si (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}). The protocol of our cryptosystem is then constructed in the following
way.
Our cryptosystem
(1) For 1  i  n, execute the following.
If si = 0, Alice then applies nothing to |ψi〉, i.e., |ψ ′i〉 = |ψi〉; otherwise she applies Z to |ψ〉, i.e.,
|ψi〉 Z⊗I→ |ψ ′i〉 =
1√
2
(|0, 0〉 − |1, 1〉). (26)
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(2) Alice announces the completion of the procedure to Bob through a public channel.
(3) For 1  i  n, execute the following:
(a) Alice applies H to |ψ ′i〉.
(b) Bob applies H to |ψ ′i〉.
That is, |ψ ′′i 〉 = H ⊗ H |ψ ′i〉.
(4) Alice announces the completion of the procedure to Bob through a public channel.
(5) Bob announces the completion of the procedure to Alice through a public channel.
(6) Alice measures |ψ ′′1 〉, |ψ ′′2 〉, . . . , |ψ ′′n 〉, and obtains n bits a = (a1, a2, . . . , an).(7) Bob measures |ψ ′′1 〉, |ψ ′′2 〉, . . . , |ψ ′′n 〉, and obtains n bits b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn).(8) Alice sends a to Bob through a public channel.
(9) Bob recovers s by computing a ⊕ b.
The announcement of step (2) does not necessarily need to be executed.
The correctness of the protocol is obvious. If both Alice and Bob execute the protocol correctly, Bob
can recover Alice’s message s because a ⊕ b = s. Therefore, we analyze the security of the protocol.
In the protocol, they do not communicate except for steps (2), (4), (5) and (8) using a public channel,
and steps (2), (4), and (5) announce only the completion of the procedures. Therefore, by these steps,
significant information is not stolen. On the other hand, by step (8), significant information is sent
from Alice to Bob. However, the value a may be subject to eavesdropping because the information is
constructed at random according to the law of quantum physics, i.e., any eavesdropper cannot find s
from only a even if he obtains a. The protocol is then secure.
Our proposed cryptosystem mentioned above is an interactive system different from the conventional
cryptosystems. Next, we propose a quantum cryptosystem that can be executed non-interactively with
prior entanglement.
Like the previous cryptosystem, let us consider that Alice sends a message s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) ∈
{0, 1}n to Bob. Here, they share n prior entangled states |ψi〉 (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}) taking the same form as
those of the previous cryptosystem. Our non-interactive cryptosystem is then constructed in the follow-
ing way.
Our non-interactive system
(1) For 1  i  n, execute the following.
If si = 0, Alice then applies nothing to |ψi〉, i.e., |ψ ′i〉 = |ψi〉; otherwise she applies X to |ψ〉, i.e.,
|ψi〉 X⊗I→ |ψ ′i〉 =
1√
2
(|1, 0〉 + |0, 1〉). (27)
(2) Alice measures |ψ ′1〉, |ψ ′2〉, . . . , |ψ ′n〉, and obtains n bits a = (a1, a2, . . . , an).(3) Alice sends a to Bob through a public channel.
(4) Bob measures |ψ ′1〉, |ψ ′2〉, . . . , |ψ ′n〉, and obtains n bits b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn).(5) Bob recovers s by computing a ⊕ b.
Note that in this cryptosystem, Bob can measure with his own timing after receiving the value a.
The correctness of the cryptosystem is obvious. If both Alice and Bob execute the system correctly,
Bob can recover Alice’s message s because a ⊕ b = s. Therefore, we analyze the security of the crypto-
system. In the system, they do not communicate except for step (3) using a public channel. By step (3),
the significant information a is sent from Alice to Bob. However, for the same reason as in the previous
cryptosystem, any eavesdropper cannot find s even if he obtains a. The cryptosystem is then secure.
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Furthermore, our non-interactive quantum cryptosystem can be extended to a cryptosystem that sends
a message to m receivers simultaneously. Let us consider that Alice sends a message s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn)
∈ {0, 1}n to m receivers, B1, B2, . . . , Bm, simultaneously. In this case, they share n prior entangled states
|ψ1〉, |ψ2〉, . . . , |ψn〉 taking the following form (cf. Eq. (9)):
|ψi〉 = 1√
2
(|0, 0, . . . , 0〉 + |1, 1, . . . , 1〉), (28)
where the length of each entangled state is m + 1 qubits, and Alice has the first qubit and each Bj(j ∈
{1, 2, . . . , m}) has the (j + 1)th qubit. Each |ψi〉 is the entangled state used for each bit si (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,
n}). We then construct a multireceiver cryptosystem, which is a simple extension of the non-interactive
system mentioned above.
Our multireceiver system
(1) For 1  i  n, execute the following.
If si = 0, Alice then applies nothing to |ψi〉, i.e., |ψ ′i〉 = |ψi〉; otherwise she applies X to |ψ〉, i.e.,
|ψi〉
X⊗⊗m+1j=2 I→ |ψ ′i〉 =
1√
2
(|1, 0, . . . , 0〉 + |0, 1, . . . , 1〉). (29)
(2) Alice measures |ψ ′1〉, |ψ ′2〉, . . . , |ψ ′n〉, and obtains n bits a = (a1, a2, . . . , an).
(3) Alice sends a to B1, B2, . . . , Bn through a public channel.
(4) Each Bj measures |ψ ′1〉, |ψ ′2〉, . . . , |ψ ′n〉, and obtains n bits b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn).
(5) Each Bj recovers s by computing a ⊕ b.
For the same reason as the non-interactive cryptosystem, this cryptosystem is also secure against any
outside party. Moreover, if the legitimate parties share the prior entanglement, no one of the parties can
manipulate the qubits of the other parties. Therefore, each Bj can obtain b correctly and can recover
Alice’s message s. The correctness of the cryptosystem is then also satisfied.
4. Comparison with related studies
In the previous two sections, we proposed protocols for splitting information among parties securely
and applied them to construct quantum cryptosystems. In this section, we compare our results with other
related studies.
First, let us consider protocols for splitting information among some parties secretly. These protocols
are thought to be a kind of secret sharing scheme. A secret sharing scheme is the following protocol:
assume that some parties cannot communicate with each other without a physical channel. A party then
has a message, splits it into some pieces, and transmits each piece to each party secretly. That is, the
parties share the message secretly among them. Moreover, although each party cannot recover it from
only his own piece, the original message can be recovered if some parties cooperate with each other.
Classical secret sharing protocols have been studied very well, but the security of almost all the
protocols is based on the difficulty of solving some problems, i.e., the computational complexity of the
problems. On the other hand, the security of quantum secret sharing protocols is based on the law of
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quantum physics, and the protocols are thought to be more secure than classical ones. Typical quantum
secret sharing protocols are discussed in [13,14].
In [14], Karlsson, Koashi, and Imoto propose a quantum secret sharing protocol using four Bell states
among three parties, a sender and two receivers. Their protocol is as follows: a sender selects one state
out of four Bell states, sends one qubit of the state to a receiver and sends another qubit to another
receiver. The two receivers independently and randomly measure the state either in the z direction or in
the x direction. By selecting one direction out of the two measurement directions at random, they can
detect any eavesdropper(if one exists). In accordance with the directions they selected, they can share
either 0 or 1 at random. However, their protocol fails with the probability 1/2 because for half of all the
possible measurement directions, the outcomes are useless.
In [13], Hillery, Buzˇek, and Berthiaume propose a different quantum secret sharing protocol. Their
protocol uses entangled states whose length is the number of parties, i.e., they use n-qubit entangled
states for n parties. After the parties share entangled states, they independently and randomly measure
either in the x direction or in the y direction. In accordance with the directions they selected, they can
share either 0 or 1 at random. However, this protocol also fails with the probability 1/2.
Now, let us compare our protocols with these protocols. These two protocols mentioned above use
two measurement directions in order to detect eavesdroppers, and the success probability of the proto-
cols becomes 1/2. On the other hand, our protocols use only one measurement direction and succeed
with certainty. Our protocols use only one form of entangled states and are unconditionally secure after
sharing entangled states. Moreover, the parties can share a value by using their protocols mentioned
above, but the value is determined at random. That is, the parties cannot share a sender’s own message.
However, by using our protocols, the parties can directly share a sender’s own message.
Next, we consider applications to cryptosystems. Many researchers have studied quantum secret key
distribution protocols because they are one of the most important quantum information security proto-
cols. Especially, theoretically and practically many results exist related to the protocol of Bennett and
Brassard [1]. However, the protocol of Bennett and Brassard [1] did not use entangled states. Later,
although Ekert [11] proposed a protocol using entangled states, the main idea of distributing keys was
the same as that of Bennett and Brassard [1].
In [9], Cabello proposes another quantum secret key distribution protocol using entangled states. The
principle of his protocol is different from that of Bennett and Brassard [1] and Ekert [11]. Cabello’s
secret key distribution protocol is as follows: a sender selects two states out of four Bell states, and a
receiver also selects one state out of the four Bell states. By applying the entanglement swapping [23] to
the three entangled states, the entangled states are then swapped and they can share a bit securely. The
main features of his protocol uses only one measurement direction and uses only Bell states (i.e., the
length of each entangled state is two) for generating a key of arbitrary length. Although it can distribute
a value secretly, his protocol cannot directly send a sender’s own secret key.
Our results in Section 3 were just the constructions of quantum cryptosystems. However, obviously,
we can realize also quantum secret key distribution protocols by applying the results. Our protocols also
satisfy the features of Cabello’s protocol mentioned above. In addition to the features, our protocols
can directly send a sender’s own secret key. Moreover, for two parties, his protocol needs six qubits for
transmitting two bits, but our protocols need only four qubits.
All the protocols mentioned above [9,13,14] were not protocols that send information directly but pro-
tocols that share information. In other words, their protocols must be combined with other cryptosystems
in order to construct a quantum cryptosystem. In [19,20], Shimizu and Imoto propose a system that can
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send information directly and can also be used as a quantum cryptosystem. Their system can detect the
presence of eavesdroppers by preparing a superposition of Bell states for each bit of a message. However,
for practical use, we must combine their system with other cryptosystems because the message sent from
a sender to a receiver through a physical channel by using their system is not encrypted. On the other
hand, because the message sent through a physical channel by using our cryptosystems is encrypted, any
eavesdropper cannot find the corresponding plaintext.
5. Conclusions
We showed quantum methods of how a party’s message is securely split among some parties. Our
results may be only theoretical results because we will have to solve many problems in order to use them
as a practical tool, e.g., correcting bit errors for communicating through noisy channels, maintaining
shared entanglement for a long time, and so on. Many researchers have already studied these problems,
and several methods to solve them have been proposed (see, e.g. [3,4,15–17,22]).
As an application of our protocols, we proposed quantum cryptosystems. Although our protocols in
Section 2 are the protocols that split information among some parties, each party obtains each split
value without communication, and the original information can be recovered only by knowing all
the split values. That is, even if some of the split values are revealed, the original information it-
self cannot be recovered. Therefore, this observation led to our quantum cryptosystems. Obviously,
our cryptosystems can also be used as key distribution protocols. Moreover, after the prior entan-
glement is shared, our quantum cryptosystems need only a classical channel, i.e., the parties send
not qubits but bits to each other. Therefore, we can also use classical information techniques in this
part.
We will be able to take several quantum states as the media that transmit information. Our results
in this paper rely on quantum entanglement. On the other hand, for example, the protocol of Bennett
and Brassard [1] relies on the transmission of single photons polarized at random along four directions,
and the protocol of Bennett [2] relies on weak coherent pulses. Moreover, Shimizu and Imoto [20]
propose a quantum cryptosystem using a single-photon interferometer. They use such quantum states
in order to detect eavesdroppers. In our protocols, however, we use the property in which the qubits
in the entanglement correlate with each other, and by sending part of the entangled states to a receiver
beforehand, a sender securely transmits a message to the receiver using the correlation between the
qubits in the entanglement without communication. Therefore, although this should still be studied more
in the future, it seems that we cannot construct protocols equivalent to our protocols by the other quantum
states mentioned above.
We think that we will be able to use our methods as a fundamental technique for information security
schemes such as electronic voting systems, authentication protocols, digital signature protocols, and so
on. For example, here, we only outline a quantum electronic voting system using our splitting method.
We will have to solve many problems for practical use. A quantum electronic voting system is construct-
ed of three parties, a polling place, a ballot-counting place, and a voter. We assume that the polling place
and the ballot-counting place are trusted.
First, the polling place creates a set of some entangled states taking the form
1√
2
(|0, 0, 0〉 + |1, 1, 1〉), (30)
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sends a set of the second qubits to a ballot-counting place, and sends a set of the third qubits to a
voter. These entangled states correspond to a ballot. Next, by using the multiparty protocol in Section
2, the voter operates his qubits according to the content of his vote. The voter corresponds to B1 in
the multiparty protocol, and the polling place and the ballot-counting place correspond to B2 and B3,
respectively. By the protocol, the content of the vote is split into three pieces, denoted by a for the
voter, by b for the polling place, and by c for the ballot-counting place. Note that a ⊕ b ⊕ c is just the
content of the vote. Next, the voter sends a to the polling place. The polling place sends x = a ⊕ b to
the ballot-counting place. Finally, the ballot-counting place obtains the content of the vote by computing
x ⊕ c.
In this protocol, the polling place can identify the voter as a legitimate voter but cannot know the
content of the vote. On the other hand, the ballot-counting place can obtain the content of the vote but
cannot know the voter of it. Obviously, the voter can vote only once without the content of the vote being
known by any outside party.
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